Evidence from a Field Experiment * Subjective expectations are fundamental for understanding individual behavior. Yet, little is known about how individuals use new information to formulate and update their subjective expectations. In this study, we exploit data from a multi-treatment field experiment to investigate how job-market information sent to jobseekers via short text messages (SMS) influence subjective job gain expectations in Peru. Results show that jobseekers who received digital intermediation based on a large information set increased their before-after job gain expectations relative to the control group. Independently of the information channel, no significant effects were found when labor-market intermediation is based on a restricted (short) set of information.
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Introduction
Understanding of the role of subjective expectations on economic behavior is central for economic modelling and policy design. While most progress in expectations literature pertains to its influence on a number of economic outcomes (see the surveys in Manski 2004 and Delavande et al. 2011) , little is known about how individuals use available information to formulate and update their subjective expectations. In fact, few studies have directly addressed the role of information on the formation of expectations (e.g., Luseno et al. 2003 , Jensen 2010 , and Stinebricker et al. 2012 ).
In the last decade, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have expanded at unprecedented rates in both developed and developing economies. In contrast to the Internet, mobile phones have become the most rapidly adopted technology in developing countries (Chong 2010) . Mobile phones allow information to travel instantly and at lower costs. Not surprisingly, a small but growing body of empirical literature has credited mobile phones with reductions in transaction costs and efficiency gains in developing settings (e.g., Jensen 2007 , Aker 2010 , and Goyal 2010 . So far, however, no study has addressed the link between digital information and subjective expectations. This paper bridges these two streams of literature by investigating how information about job-market opportunities sent to jobseekers via short text messages (SMS) influence subjective expectations. By providing faster, better, and cheaper access to information, mobile phone technologies might influence job gain expectations, as searchers can access relevant, up-to-date information on job vacancies. From a theoretical perspective, job decisions are forward-looking and thus involve expectations. For instance, sequential search models that incorporate uncertainty about the wage distribution are based on expectations that depend on information 2 signals coming from the wage offers individuals observe during their search time (e.g., Diagne 2010).
As expectations could be merely proxying for other unobserved characteristics, a distinctive feature of this study is its field experimental design with multiple treatments. We use data from the Public Intermediation System in Peru, a country that adopted an innovative egovernment initiative in labor intermediation. Searchers that signed up to receive public labormarket intermediation were randomly assigned to four treatment groups according to two information channels (i.e., digital and non-digital intermediation) and the scope of information they received (i.e., short [public] and enhanced [public/private] information sets).
This study finds that jobseekers subject to digital labor-market intermediation based on a large set of information show a positive and statistically significant change in their job gain expectations three months after signing up for public labor-market intermediation. This result suggests that the combination of digital technology and the scope of the information set matters rather than the technology by itself.
The Intervention: Institutions, Treatment, and Data
The experimental design was implemented as part of the regular (non-experimental) public intermediation system CIL-PROEMPLEO, which is run nationally for the Ministry of Labor in Peru and offers intermediation services, electronic information on the labor markets, and low-cost reemployment services to jobseekers who voluntarily sign up for these services. percent of the sample was subject to digital labor-market intermediation.
The short-non-digital treatment group was subject to the standard CIL-PROEMPLEO intermediation practices. In contrast to this treatment group, the digital treatment groups 2 and 3 were exposed to a technological innovation aimed to reduce job search costs. Jobseekers assigned to these groups were informed about job-market opportunities that match their labor profile through digital services; i.e., delivery of SMS messages to their mobile phones. The difference between treatment groups 2 and 3 is given by the set of information available to them.
According to CIL-PROEMPLEO regulations, job matches are based only on firms that signed up on the public intermediation system. Treatment group 3 relaxed this restriction by considering an enhanced set of information coming from job opportunities generated outside the CIL-PROEMPLEO system (e.g., job boards, national newspapers ads, and non-profit private employment agencies). 3 Independently of whether individuals belong to the short-or enhanceddigital treatment groups, the framing of the information sent to jobseekers via SMS follows a standard structure and is limited to the description of the occupation and contact information. 4 Finally, control group individuals were removed temporarily from the information system for a period of three months.
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Comparison of treatment groups 2 and 3 allows one to test the impact of expanding the set of information available to jobseekers while holding fixed the information technology. From a theoretical standpoint, however, more information does not automatically lead the updating of subjective (job) expectations. Information theory states that if individuals update their expectations (or change their behavior) in response to new information they receive, then that information has value to them. According to Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) , the value of information is determined by three important factors-confidence, novelty, and ability and willingness to act based on updated beliefs-all of which involve different forces and trade-offs.
Individuals process new information largely based on their prior beliefs. If job seekers, for instance, place strong confidence in their initial beliefs, more information is not necessarily more valuable, all else held constant. Evidence from behavioral economics, for instance, suggests that individuals who formulate their initial beliefs based on poor past experiences have difficulty interpreting subsequent new information, as initial expectations tend to anchor one's processing of information (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) , thus leading to the so-called 'cognitive confirmation bias', a state on which people tend to ignore new information altogether or misread it (Griffin and Tversky, 1992) .
Moreover, the greater the confidence in the message, the greater its effect on the updating of the subjective probability distribution. In this regard, it is noteworthy to recall that public labor market intermediation systems are populated with individuals with chronic problems of employability (Autor, 2001) . 6 As such, they could have developed strong initial beliefs given their relatively poor experience in the marketplace, a genuine distrust of information coming from public sources, or both. If that is the case, they will not update mechanically their initial expectations in response to more information.
On the other hand, if new information constitutes a novelty relative to the individual's initial expectations, then one expects a strong updating effect. In our view, the distinctiveness between short [public] and enhanced [public/private] information sets involves a novelty factor since historically the (standard) public intermediation system has operated only with information from a limited group of (low-quality) firms. Finally, the value of the information also depends on individuals' ability and willingness to respond to the new information. In this regard, incentives and constraints affect how individuals react to information shocks. For instance, there are some mitigating concerns with regard to the effectiveness of digital information in developing countries due to the lack of human capital and language barriers between the users of the technology and the technology itself (Chong, 2010) .
In all, the effect of more information on subjective expectations is ultimately an empirical question and depends on the relative strengths and forces of different attributes of information.
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From an empirical standpoint little is known about how individuals update their subjective expectations in real life in response to new information (see Manski, 2004; Delavande et al., 2011) . Available evidence suggests that if individuals update expectations, they do it with a predictable bias towards optimism. In fact, empirical studies show that new valuable information is often read optimistically rather than objectively, since people underreact to negative information and overreact to positive information (e.g., Easterwood and Nutt, 1999; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003) .
The baseline dataset contains information for 1,189 individuals, which implies an attrition rate of 7 percent relative to the original sampling design. 7 Out of this data, 29, 16, and 25 percent correspond to treatment groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively, while the remaining 30 percent correspond to the control group. A critical step in the estimation of the causal treatment effects is an analysis of how effective the randomization was. Table 1 shows the mean baseline distribution for a large set of socio-demographic and labor-market variables across all treatment groups. Panel A shows that the average individual in our sample has completed high school education, is younger than 30 years old, and is single. There is a slight disproportion in the rate of enrollment by gender, as 55 percent of registered users are men. Only 30 percent of users have offspring, while one-fourth of them were not born in Lima. The p-value of F-test for the equality of means across all four randomised groups is above 0.05 for all variables except age.
Panels B and C show the mean distribution for baseline variables related to prior labor market experiences and ICT exposure. The data show that most individuals in the sample had previous job experience in the private sector, worked on average 35 hours per week, and earned 560 soles per month. Less than one-third of them had fringe benefits, including health insurance 7 and pension plans. Moreover, most jobseekers have experience using mobile phones and the Internet in general, while around half of the sample has used these electronic gadgets for job search purposes. The p-value of the F-test for the equality of means is above 0.05 for all variables considered in these two panels.
Finally, Panel D shows the distribution of future job gain expectations. The baseline survey asks, "Are you optimistic you will find a job in the next three months?" with answers on a Likert scale of 'very optimistic', 'somewhat optimistic', 'only a little optimistic', or 'do not expect to find a job'. 8 Almost 68 percent of job seekers were very optimistic, while 26 and 5 percent were somewhat and only a little optimistic, respectively. Surprisingly, almost no one expects not to find a job. The p-value of F-test for the equality of means is above 0.05 for all of these categories. In sum, the statistical analyses suggest that the sample of individuals assigned to all of the different groups were drawn from the same population.
Empirical Framework and Results
The estimation framework is based on a standard difference-in-difference approach: Because it is possible that previous labor-market experiences exert strong influence on future job expectations, in column 3 we also include a rich set of baseline labor-market characteristics. Results show a small increase in the magnitude of 3 β (17 percentage points), which is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level. In fact, columns 2 and 3 in Table   2 show that all baseline socio-demographic and labor-market variables are not statistically related to the outcome of interest, which adds evidence of the balancing property of the experimental design. Finally, as searchers were randomly allocated to four different groups on a daily basis following the normal inflow of applicants, we have as many experimental sets as different days the experimental sampling lasted. We therefore included in column 4 a date fixed effects to control for intra-day variation in the treatment allocation. The point estimates show slight variation with respect to results depicted in columns 2 and 3. Clustered standard errors by 9 date report statistically significant impacts at the 5 percent level for the enhanced-digital treatment group.
These results tell a consistent story: It is not the technology itself that causes a (statistically) significant effect on job gain expectations, but rather, it is an enhanced set of information about labor-market opportunities transmitted through digital means which explains our findings. In our view it is the value of the information generated by the complementarity between the novelty of the [public/private] information and the higher number of messages received that might explain this relative gain in job expectations. 9 These results matter because subjective job expectations are a meaningful predictor of subsequent work status (Stephens 2004 ) and are associated with job search effort (Diagne 2010 ) and wage growth (Campbell et al. 2007 ). 
Conclusion
This study exploits a multi-treatment experimental design implemented as part of the regular (non-experimental) public intermediation system in Peru to investigate the extent to which digital labor-market intermediation influences subjective job gain expectations.
Application of a standard difference-in-difference estimator reveals that jobseekers who received digital intermediation based on a large information set increase their before-after job gain expectations relative to the control group. Independent of the information channel, no significant effects were found when labor-market intermediation is based on a restricted (short) set of 10
information. An extended analysis about the role of digital labor-market intermediation and the scope of information sets on unemployment spells and job search effort is the next step for us. 
